Crypto Community Slams LayerZero: More verifiers won't stop the next $290M Hack


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LayerZero is facing heavy criticism for its response to the recent $290 million KelpDAO exploit after the omnichain interoperability protocol blamed Kelpâs 1-of-1 verifier configuration for the incident.
LayerZero Blames KelpDAO For $290M Exploit
Over the weekend, liquid restaking protocol KelpDAO was the victim of an attack that drained over $290 million in rsETH from the project after malicious actors exploited a weakness in the protocolâs LayerZero-powered bridge.
Two days later, LayerZero addressed the incident, which became the largest DeFi hack of 2026, just weeks after Drift Protocolâs $285 million exploit shocked the industry.
LayerZero attributed the âhighly sophisticated attackâ to North Koreaâs Lazarus Group, claiming that it was a crypto infrastructure attack rather than a protocol exploit, and affirming that âthere is zero contagion to any other cross-chain assets or applications.â
They explained that the protocol is built on a âfoundation of modular, application-configurable security,â using Decentralized Verifier Networks (DVNs), independent entities responsible for verifying the integrity of cross-chain messages.
The malicious actors allegedly poisoned downstream RPC infrastructure by âcompromising a quorum of the RPCs the LayerZero Labs DVN relied upon to verify transactions.â
Per the post, the attackers swapped binaries for a custom payload to forge messages and used DDoS attacks to force failover to the poisoned nodes, triggering the DVN into confirming fake transactions.
Based on this, LayerZero placed responsibility on KelpDAO for using a 1-of-1 verifier configuration instead of the multi-DVN recommendations: âThis incident was isolated entirely to KelpDAOâs rsETH configuration as a direct consequence of their single-DVN setup.â
Crypto Community Criticizes âLack Of Accountabilityâ
The crypto community reacted to the post-mortem, sharing its concerns about LayerZeroâs response and criticizing the protocol for placing all responsibility only on Kelpâs security setup.
âImagine building a bridge and vehicles pays to cross, the bridge collapsed and you said itâs their fault for crossing the bridge. A classic clownery act from Bunch of clowns with zero accountability,â X user Saint wrote.
Others questioned why LayerZero included a â1-of-1â configuration if the purpose of a DVN is customizable/modular security. âIf the system allows this option, itâs not the fault of the customer who chose itâitâs a fundamental design flaw by the system that permitted it,â user Ditto wrote.
âAt the end of the day, the fact remains that the DVN RPC was compromised. DVN is a LayerZero product, and they are the ones who sold it to these teams,â he continued.
Similarly, Chainlink community manager Zach Rynes accused the protocol of deflecting responsibility for the compromise of their own DVN node.
He also criticized them for âthrowing KelpDAO under the busâ for trusting LayerZero Labsâ setup that they âwillingly support and only blocked after getting hacked, all while claiming everything worked as designed.â
Meanwhile, Yearn Finance core team developer Artem K noted on X that the attack was described as a compromise of an RPC node and RPC poisoning, but that their own infrastructure is what was compromised. âGiven it doesnât say how the breach has occurred, I wouldnât rush re-enabling the bridges,â he added.
Wrong Diagnosis, Wrong Fix?Analyst The Smart Ape also claims that LayerZero made the wrong diagnosis and offered the wrong solution. Notably, the protocolâs post-mortem suggested migrating all applications with 1-of-1 DVN configurations to multi-DVN setups to prevent similar attacks.
However, the analyst pointed out that multi-verifiers wonât stop the next multi-million-dollar attack, asserting that they could fail as all DVNs read chain states from the same handful of RPC providers, which are mostly clustered on AWS or GCP.
If five âindependentâ DVNs read from the same three RPC providers, an attacker who poisons those three RPCs will poison all five verifiers simultaneously. âIf all your verifiers get fooled in the same way at the same time, the math collapses back to 1-of-1. Five clones are not five witnesses,â he added.
To solve this, the analyst suggested that every verifier runs its own full node on different client software, hosted on different cloud providers, maintained by different ops teams, peered with different subsets of the Ethereum network.
âThe fix isnât multi-anything. The fix is that verifiers should attest to their own substrate, not just to chain state. until you can audit a DVNâs upstream topology, which RPC providers, which client software, which clouds, which regions, âM-of-N securedâ is marketing copy for a property that hasnât actually been built. Lazarus didnât break cryptography on April 18. They broke three servers,â he concluded.