Op-Ed: C5 + 1- Central Asia and the critical mineral race of the West is late to map


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For many Westerners, Kazakhstan still registers first as a punchline, the target of a crude 2006 movie parody that flattened a serious country into a caricature. The film was a cheap shot. It is also a strange image to have stuck to the ninth-largest country on Earth, the worldâs largest uranium producer and the most consequential of the five nations that make up Central Asia.
Ask a well-informed Western reader to name the other four and most stall immediately. Ask them to distinguish Kazakhstan from Tajikistan, or Uzbekistan from Turkmenistan, or explain how the mining prospects of one differ from the next, and almost no one can. To Western eyes, the region often registers as one interchangeable expanse of desert, steppe and mountains wedged between Russia and China.
That blind spot is becoming a liability.
As the United States and its allies scramble to build critical mineral supply chains outside Chinaâs control, the five Central Asian republics have moved from the margins toward centre stage. The first thing to understand about Central Asiaâs role in the race is that the five âstansâ are not a single opportunity but five. Reading them as one interchangeable bloc is the surest way to misjudge which countries to back, and when.
From backwater forum to industrial strategy
The C5+1 was an obscure US-driven diplomatic effort that has quickly taken on outsized importance in the critical minerals chase. It has convened annually since 2015, when then-Secretary of State John Kerry gathered the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan into a standing dialogue with the US.
For most of its first decade, the initiative was a low-stakes diplomatic courtesy. But in September 2023 it was elevated to its first leadersâ summit, and in November 2025 the five presidents met again in Washington. Kazakhstan signed a critical minerals memorandum with the United States there, while Uzbekistan signed its own months later.
The next round comes this June in Astana, Kazakhstanâs capital. The C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue will be held at the same venue immediately before the Astana Mining and Metallurgy Congress, with senior US officials attending both.
The momentum is real, and it warrants the mining industryâs attention. But attention without discrimination is the trap. Although the C5 label groups them together, each of the five is distinct, and those differences are particularly sharp when it comes to mining.
Five countries, five game boards
The similarities are real, which is what makes the lumping so tempting. All five are landlocked former Soviet republics that became independent in 1991. All inherited Soviet infrastructure deliberately built to route mineral and energy exports through Russia rather than to other markets. All practise some version of a multi-vector foreign policy, balancing Moscow, Beijing and the West without fully committing to any of them.
Take those genuine commonalities and it is easy to assume the similarities run all the way down. But understanding the differences is where both the opportunity and the risk reside.
Kazakhstan is the anchor, and it is not a close contest. It produces roughly 40% of the worldâs mined uranium. It is a leading producer of chromium and a significant source of copper, zinc and ferroalloys, supported by an established industrial and metallurgical base. It also has the regionâs most developed regulatory institutions, is home to Kazatomprom, one of the only Central Asian miners with an international listing, and has shown a strong appetite for Western capital. When the C5+1 talks about critical minerals, Kazakhstan is where the conversation starts, and rightfully so.
Uzbekistan is the second anchor, and the gap between first and second is partly self-inflicted. For its first decades of independence, it operated one of the regionâs most closed economies, which helps explain why Kazakhstan, not Uzbekistan, holds the inside rail today. Since 2016, Uzbekistan has opened deliberately to foreign investment and begun closing the distance. It is home to Muruntau, one of the largest open-pit gold mines on Earth, alongside meaningful uranium and copper production. Of the five, it is the country most likely to keep gaining ground.
After the two anchors, the picture changes character.
Kyrgyzstanâs mining economy is built around a single major asset, the Kumtor gold mine. It also sits in the shadow of the 2021 seizure in which the state took operational control of Kumtor from its Canadian operator, Centerra Gold. That event became a cautionary signal for Western capital and should not be ignored. It also should not be over-read. Whether it was the leading edge of a broader nationalization trend or a singular episode Kyrgyzstan has little reason to repeat remains unsettled.
Tajikistanâs story is antimony, an obscure metal turned critical-minerals poster child because of its use in munitions, semiconductors and flame retardants. It is the worldâs second-largest producer after China and the natural candidate to help fill supply gaps after Beijing imposed export restrictions in 2024. Unfortunately for the West, almost all of that production still passes through China before reaching the market.
Turkmenistan is the outlier. It holds the worldâs fourth-largest natural gas reserves, but that endowment, combined with one of the worldâs most isolationist governments, means it barely figures in the hard-rock minerals story. Folding it into a single C5+1 critical minerals dialogue risks misreading the region at the most basic level.
Lay the five side by side and the strategic point emerges on its own. For now, the Westâs positioning is focused mainly on Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan should grow into a larger role over the medium term. The other three have potential, but lack the endowment, institutions or openness that would make them more than intriguing long-term prospects. Same region, similar histories, but five very different game boards.
Deposits are not supply chain
Even for the two anchors, having the deposits is the easy part. The hard part is everything between the deposit and the customer, where optimism tends to outrun reality.
Kazakhstanâs tungsten is the clearest illustration. State holding company Tau-Ken Samruk and a US investment partner are advancing a joint venture on the North Katpar and Upper Kairakty deposits, which together could one day make Kazakhstan the worldâs second-largest tungsten producer.
Yet in 2025, the entirety of Kazakhstanâs tungsten concentrates exports, roughly 3,700 tonnes worth about US$71 million, went to a single destination: China. The country already controls close to 80% of global tungsten supply and most of its refining capacity. A signing ceremony does not redirect a supply chain.
Chinaâs dominance in refining and processing is the deeper problem, and the one the West has yet to solve. Pulling ore from the ground in Kazakhstan makes little difference if it passes through China before reaching Western markets. New upstream projects can, perversely, deepen the very dependence they were intended to relieve.
Ambitious agreements do not negate geographic realities. Any ore mined in this landlocked region still travels along legacy routes north into Russia or east toward China. The Westâs proposed answer is the Middle Corridor, a route crossing the Caspian Sea and stretching toward Europe while bypassing both Russian and Iranian territory.
So far, it has had more bark than bite.
Each time the corridor appears close to a breakthrough, the regionâs multi-vector instinct tends to reassert itself. The leverage these states gain from being courted by everyone at once is real, but it is also an impediment. Russia, China and the West each want a larger share of the pie while limiting opportunities for the others.
Stop seeing one place
An honest assessment must hold both the potential and the risk. The geological riches are undeniable, but the geographic challenges are unavoidable. Whether Kazakhstan, or any other C5 country, can meaningfully loosen Chinaâs grip on critical minerals remains an open question.
C5+1 summits and dialogues, including the one taking place this month in Astana, can provide direction and are a diplomatic necessity. They do not create development velocity on their own. Still, every journey begins with a few initial steps.